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Abstract
In recent history, the use of Steel Moment Resisting Frames (SMRF) in many
structural steel buildings has become popular among many engineers and designers. The
use of these moment resisting frames allows for more open spaces between floors and
columns than in buildings that use the more traditional braced frame construction. One of
the critical aspects of the moment resisting frames is the connections between the beams
and the columns. The Northridge earthquake near Los Angeles California in 1994 showed
that the existing designs for SMRF connections were inadequate and unstable. As a
result, new connection designs were needed for SMRF construction. This thesis will first
discuss the causes for the failures of the SMRF connections that were discovered after the
Northridge earthquake. Next, new performance and testing requirements for new
connection designs will be examined. Lastly, one possible solution, the SidePlate
connection system, will be analyzed.
Professor Jerome Connor
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Thesis Supervisor
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1. Introduction
The current construction of numerous steel structures utilize steel moment
resisting frames (SMRF) in their design. The use of the steel moment resisting frames is
popular because they allow more open space between floors and columns than buildings
that use the more traditional braced frame construction. This extra space is attractive
because it gives more flexibility in the use of the building and also allows for more open
views. In addition, the moment resisting frames offer these extra benefits at a relatively
low construction cost. Based on these added advantages the popularity of the moment
resisting frames is evident.
One of the critical aspects of the moment resisting frames is the connections
between the beams and the columns of the frames. Ideally, these joints should be able to
resist applied moments by transmitting the moments from the beam to the column with
no relative rotation of the members. More specifically, the connections will transfer
moments through the beam flanges where the majority of the moment capacity is
developed. The connections typically use complete penetration welds to directly attach
the beam flanges to the column flanges. These welds are supposed to be able to transfer a
moment equal to the moment capacity of the beam flanges. Sufficient toughness in the
weld material is required so that the forces can properly flow from the beams to the
columns in a ductile manner. Ductile behavior is vital because it allows the connection to
absorb applied energy through material yielding and leads to gradual failure of the frames
in the event of extreme loading such as a strong earthquake. In short, the performance of
the moment resisting frames is based on slow plastic behavior that will prevent sudden
collapse of the structure and ensure the safety of the occupants of the building.
The popularity and abundant use of moment resisting frames led to the
incorporation of a standard design procedure for SMRF connections in the 1988 Uniform
Building Code [1]. This formal acceptance of a standardized detail for SMRF
connections in the code was essentially a validation that the existing connections were
properly designed and safe. As a result, the code recommended connection designs were
confidently used in projects by engineers under the assumptions that the connections
would perform in the intended ductile manner. These connections were believed to be
able to adequately withstand and resist both earthquake and wind loads.
The Northridge earthquake near Los Angeles California that occurred on January
17, 1994 proved that the code prescribed SMRF connections that were assumed to be safe
were in reality inadequate and unstable. After the Northridge earthquake, inspectors
discovered that many SMRF connections had cracks both in the base metal and the weld
material. These cracks are indicative of brittle failure which was not supposed to happen
in the connections. This discovery was devastating because the brittle failures of the
connections basically nullified the purpose of the connections. As a result, use of the
previously approved building code designs for SMRF connections were immediately
banned and research sponsored by both the federal and local government in Los Angeles
began to first uncover the causes for the brittle failures of the pre-Northridge connections
and then to develop new and properly designed connection systems.
This thesis will first discuss the causes of the brittle failures of the SMRF
connections that were discovered after the Northridge earthquake. Faults in the materials,
design, and construction of the pre-Northridge connections that led to their unexpected
failure will be described. Next, the performance and testing requirements for new
connections that were set forth by investigators and researchers will be presented. Lastly,
one possible solution, the SidePlate connection system, which was the first connection
technology approved for use under the new guidelines, will be described and analyzed.
2. Causes Of Failure
2.1 Overview
After the earthquakes in Northridge, California and in Kobe, Japan inspections of
moment connections done by structural engineers revealed that many SMRF connections
failed due to brittle, premature fracturing. More specifically, various SMRF connections
suffered major cracks extending through the column flange and into the column web, had
large pieces or "nuggets" of steel that were pulled out of the column, or had cracks
through the full penetration welds that extended into the column [8]. The brittle cracking
of the connections was a surprise to many engineers because the existing SMRF
connections, like the one shown in figure 2.1 below, were designed to dissipate energy
through the formation of plastic hinges at the connection that would lead to inelastic
deformation.





S; - Shear plate
Continuity plate Beam' flange
Column flange
Fig. 2.1 Typical Moment Connection from Ojdrovic and Zarghamee [8].
Therefore, the brittle failure mode that was observed was exactly the opposite of
the behavior that was expected. The brittle fractures occurred before the plastic hinges
had a chance to develop. In short, the whole premise and basic concepts from which the
SMRF connections were designed were undermined by the premature brittle failures of
the systems.
After extensive investigation performed after the Northridge earthquake by
researchers and investigators into the causes of the brittle fractures of the SMRF
connections, it was found that there were four main factors that contributed to the
failures. These four factors were the effects of applied stresses, poor quality welding, low
toughness of the welding material, and poorly designed connection features [8]. It was the
combined effects of these factors that led to failures of the SMRF connections.
2.2 Effects of applied stresses
The first factor that contributed to the brittle failure of the connections was the
effect of stresses that were applied to connections. The first stresses that were found were
those that were applied to the system as a result of seismic and gravity loads. The effect
of gravity loads on the connections is usually negligible because the beams and the
columns are designed to take the lateral loads which significantly reduces the stress
placed on the connection. On the other hand, the effect of seismic loads produces
significant tensile stress in the bottom flange of the beam. Furthermore, the effect of the
floor slab, which raises the neutral axis of the beam through composite action, leads to an
increase in the tensile stresses applied to the bottom flange. These stresses were well
understood by engineers who designed the connections [8].
In addition to the obvious stresses causes by the applied loads, it was found that
there were stresses that came from residual stresses in the steel shapes and also from the
welding of the beam flange to the column flange. As reported by Ojdrovic and
Zarghamee, these stresses were generally not accounted for by engineers that designed the
connections. The effect of these residual stresses, particularly those due to the welding,
was the production of additional tensile stresses along the column flange and the root pass
of the weld. It has been hypothesized that these tensile stresses created a path through
which cracks could propagate from the column flange to the column web [8]. Ideally, the
tensile stresses from the applied loads are supposed to yield the material of the SMRF
connection and cause plastic hinges to form in the beam. Yet the plastic behavior did not
occur. Perhaps the additional tension that was caused by the residual stresses weakened
the connections and the welds so that brittle failure occurred before the designed plastic
failure. Another idea that has been presented is the effect of a triaxial stress concentration
located in the middle of the weld that connects the beam flange to the column flange.






Fig. 2.2: Triaxial Stress Concentration on Beam Flange from D. Houghton [3]
It has been suggested that the area of the beam and column on which the triaxial
stresses act is subjected to non-uniform stress that originates from the geometry of the
connection, the localized stiffness caused by the column web, and the residual stresses
caused by the welds [3]. This triaxial stress may have led to the brittle failures of the
connections. The effects of the connection geometry and welding will be discussed in
greater detail in later sections of this chapter.
The investigation into the effects of the various loads and corresponding stresses
on the SMRF connections indicates that the pre-Northridge earthquake connections were
designed without considering all of the possible load cases and sources of stress. It seems
that designers considered the effects of applied loads on the connections but might have
overlooked or underestimated the effects of residual tensile stresses that were introduced
to the connection systems mainly through the welding process. It is these additional
stresses that might have led to the premature, brittle failure of the connections.
2.3 Effect of poor quality welding
The next factor that contributed to the premature failures of the SMRF
connections was the effect of poor quality welding. As detailed by Ojdrovic and
Zarghamee [8], it was found that after the earthquakes, inspection of welds in floors in a
number of buildings that were below the ground surface and were not effected by seismic
loads revealed a variety of faults in the quality of the welds. More specifically, it was
discovered that many welds exhibited cracks, porosity, slag, or a lack of fusion to the base
metal. These various defects caused the weld material to behave inadequately in terms of
not properly binding the various steel members. The extent of poor quality welding was
widespread in many buildings. For instance, in one building in the Los Angeles area
inspectors found that 85% of the welds had one or more of these defects. On average, the
cracks in the welds had a length equal to approximately 20% of the beam flange
thickness. Comparing this to standards set by the American Welding Society, which
specify that acceptable crack size be limited to only 10% of the beam flange thickness for
dynamically loaded structures, shows that the cracks found in the welds were larger than
the acceptable, critical length. In short, it can be said that the faults in the welding were
well below the acceptable limits
The presence of the faults is not surprising because some of the welding is very
difficult to see, reach, and properly install in the field. This is particularly true for the
welding of the lower beam flange to the column flange because of the awkward position
and low visibility of the weld. In this case, the effects of faults in the weld are amplified
because the connection of the beam flange to the column flange is an area of stress
concentration. Unfortunately, these types of welds cannot be done in the shop and can
only be performed in the field. Thus, the poor quality of welds might have been known
but there was little that could have been done due to the difficult field conditions under
which the welds were installed.
In a sense, it seems that the faults in the welds predetermined the brittle failure of
the connections even before the impact of the seismic loading. These defects in welding
could have undermined the stability and integrity of the welds which in turn could limit
the effectiveness of the entire connection system. A possible explanation for the large
number of faults that were found could be the difficulty of installing the welds on the job
site. Possible solutions to this problem might be to find a way to weld the members
together in a controlled shop environment or to change the design of the connection so
that welds are easier to see and install.
2.4 Low toughness of weld material
The next area of concern was found to be low toughness of the welding material.
Toughness is defined as the ability of a material to absorb energy. This problem is
described by Ojdrovic and Zarghamee in an article in the Proceedings of the Institution of
Civil Engineers, Structures and Buildings volume 122 number 2 [8]. The majority of
welds used in the SMRF connections that failed were made using the standard flux core
arc welding (FCAW) method with the standard E70 wire fed electrodes. This method is
popular because it is easy to implement in the field and is also inexpensive. However, the
problem with this method is that the E70 electrodes contain high levels of aluminum and
nitrogen that combine to give the material a low toughness. Another drawback associated
with this method is that the quality of the welds is affected by too many conditions, such
as the interpass temperature, preheat, and postheat, that are very difficult to monitor and
control in the field. The low toughness of the weld material was verified by investigators
by using the Charpy V-notch test (CVN) on the welds. The CVN test measures energy
absorption and material toughness and gives values in terms ofjoules. For typical E70
electrode weld materials that were tested, it was found that the electrodes had CVN
values ranging from 8 to 26 Joules at a temperature of 20 oC and 4 to 8 Joules at a 0 oC.
The minimum CVN value for the weld material required to prevent cracking, as specified
by the American Welding Society, is 28.7 Joules. This result indicates that the weld
toughness was too low to prevent crack propagation during an earthquake. Furthermore,
the low toughness of the welds would still have caused crack propagation even if the
welds were within acceptable flaw size and the steel had the required yield strength. The
required yield strength for A36 steel members, which are the most commonly used in
construction, of 248 MPa was generally satisfied in the buildings that were inspected. The
adequate yield strength measured in the steel members shows that the members
themselves were not likely to cause crack propagation. Therefore, it is apparent that the
low toughness of the weld material that was used in many buildings did not allow the
intended plastic deformation and plastic energy dissipation to occur without brittle
fracture of the welded joints.
2.5 Faults in existing designs
2.5.1 Overview
The next area of concern is design flaws in existing connection systems that did
not consider the importance and danger of brittle fracture. These faults in the existing
connection schemes could be a result of underestimating or ignoring the causes for brittle
failure on the part of the designers. Some of the major deficiencies of the designs that
caused them to behave inadequately and led to brittle failure were: poor geometry and
layout of members that undermined the effectiveness of welding, an over reliance on the
through-thickness properties of the members, and panel zone weakness that did not
prevent or stop crack propagation [3].
2.5.2 Poor geometry in designs
The first problem with the existing designs is that the geometry of the joints is laid
out in a way that weakens the welds and creates problems in adequately installing welds
in the field. The major area of concern in the design is the connection of the bottom beam
flange to the column flange.
The issue is with the welding that is required in this section of the connection.
First of all, the welding of the bottom beam flange is interrupted by the beam web which
causes the weld to be stopped and continued on the other side of the web. This stoppage
disturbs the continuity of the weld which essentially creates a weak spot under the web of
the beam. Furthermore, the interruption leads to slag and lack of fusion on the weld
material which further weakens the connection. In fact, it was discovered that the
majority of the defects in welds were concentrated around the center of the weld where it
was interrupted [8]. Lastly, the geometry of the connection is such that the bottom beam
flange is difficult to see and reach in the field. This makes the welding difficult and prone
to defects in the quality of the welds. In conclusion, the layout of the existing designs
contributes to the weakening of the welds which, in turn, may lead to the brittle failure of
the connections.
2.5.3 Problems with through-thickness properties
The second deficiency, as described by David Houghton in Building to Last:
Proceedings of Structures Congress XV [3], in the design of the SMRF connections was
an over reliance of the through-thickness properties of the beam and column. This
property, as illustrated in figure 2.4 below, consists of the thickness of the column area
near the weld that connects the beam to the column.
Through Thickness
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Fig. 2.3: Through Thickness Property of Beam and Column from D. Houghton [3]
The brittle failure of the through-thickness properties in the connections was in
the form of divots or "nuggets" that were pulled out of the columns and beams.
Unfortunately, investigators could not find any exact reasons for this type of failure and
the behavior that causes the failure is not clearly understood. This lack of understanding
was acknowledged in the interim design and repair guidelines set forth after the
Northridge earthquake by the joint venture consisting of the Structural Engineers of
California, the Applied Technology Council, and the California Universities of Research
in Earthquake Engineering. This group, known as SAC, was basically in charge of
reviewing and revising code standards after the Northridge earthquake. In regards to the
through-thickness properties of the SMRF connections, the SAC committee could not
find an adequate solution for the through-thickness problem because of the large
uncertainty and complexity involved with the behavior of the connections. The only
suggestion offered by SAC to engineers regarding the design of new connection systems
was:
In the interim, engineers choosing to utilize connections relying on
through-thickness strength should recognize that despite the successful
testing, connections relying on the through-thickness strength can not be
considered to be fully reliable until the influence of the other parameters...
can be fully understood. A high amount of structural redundancy is
recommended for frames employing connections which rely on through-
thickness strength of the column flange [3].
These recommendations suggest that because of the high uncertainty, the through-
thickness properties should be avoided whenever possible. Furthermore, in the event that
the through-thickness strength must be used in the connection, the SAC recommendations
indicate that the connections should be overdesigned to insure that through-thickness
failure will not occur. This suggestion is not very practical because overdesigning
connections will be inefficient and increase costs for building owners. Unfortunately, it
seems that the only solutions available to deal with the through-thickness problem is to
either avoid relying on it, overdesigning it, or even designing a new type of connection.
2.5.4 Failures due to panel zone weakness
The third major problem described by David Houghton in Building to Last [3] that
was found in the Pre-Northridge earthquake connection designs was failures due to low
strength and stiffness in panel zones. Panel zones consist of the sections of the SMRF
connections that connect the bottom beam flange to the column flange. It was found that
the material properties of this area were inadequate and the panel zones were basically too
weak to withstand the loading that was applied to the connections. The panel zone
weakness contributed to the brittle failures of the column web as shown in figure 2.5
below
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Fig. 2.4 Fracture Due to Weak Panel Zone from D. Houghton [3]
Ideally, the panel zones should be strong enough to allow plastic deformation to
occur in them so that local buckling of the beam flange can develop. This, in turn, leads
to the desired plastic deformation of the connection system in general. This pattern of
failure did not occur because the panel zones cracked before they could plastically
deform. Detailed research after the Northridge earthquake conducted at the University of
California, Berkeley concluded that the inadequate strength and stiffness in the panel
zones of connections led to the brittle failures because the panel zones were unable to
achieve enough rotational capacity to withstand the effects of cyclic loading. More
specifically, the panel zone failures were summarized by one researcher as being due to "
... large shear deformations in the column panel zone... caused by severe kinking in the
column at the connection. Failure appeared to have started in the web/flange fillet of the
column and progressed through the flange and into the web of the column" [3]. These
results indicate that the weak panel zones failed to prevent cracks from propagating from
the weld into the column. Thus, it seems that the low strength of the panel zones
compromised the connection system by not allowing plastic deformation to occur and
also by failing to prevent cracks from propagating from the weld into the column.
In summary, the low strength of the panel zone is a major problem because many
of the older moment connections relied on the panel zones to properly absorb the energy
from the applied loads. Adequate panel zone strength and stiffness is needed in order for
the connections to achieve the desired plastic deformation behavior and prevent cracks
from propagating through the column. In order to prevent failures due to weak panel
zones, perhaps new connections can be designed to incorporate materials that will
provide substantial strength and stiffness so that the connection will have enough
rotational capacity to withstand the applied cyclic loads. Hopefully, the adequate
rotational capacity will lead to the desired plastic behavior that is needed to prevent
premature brittle failures.
2.6 Conclusions
After the investigation of the failures of the Steel Moment Resisting Frames
connections due to the effects of the Northridge earthquake, it was obvious that the
existing connections were inadequate and needed to be reanalyzed and redesigned. It was
concluded that various deficiencies in the design, materials, and construction contributed
to the premature, brittle failures of the connections. These findings indicate that future
designs should focus on increasing overall ductility of the systems to reduce the
likelihood of brittle failure. In order to prevent brittle behavior, the welds should be made
with electrode material that offers more toughness than the standard E70 type that is
commonly used. Furthermore, better overall workmanship should be achieved in the
installation of the welds. This could possibly be done by designing connection systems
that are easier to construct in terms of offering adequate visibility and accessibility for
builders. Engineers that design new connections should be aware of residual and triaxial
stresses that prestress the welds and members, thus making them more susceptible to
cracking. Engineers should also avoid certain design parameters that have been shown to
contribute to brittle failures such as through-thickness properties and weak panel zones.
3. New Design Requirements
3.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 1994 Northridge earthquake in California, the extensive
investigations into the causes of the failures of the Steel Moment Resisting Frame
(SMRF) connections revealed inadequacies in practically every facet of the connections.
It was discovered that numerous aspects of the design, material properties, and
workmanship involved with the Pre-Northridge earthquake SMRF connections were
seriously flawed. Some of the major problems that were discovered included: over
reliance on through-thickness properties that caused "nuggets" of base metal to be pulled
out of the connection, weak panel zones that prevented the connections from achieving
adequate rotational capacity, a lack of understanding into triaxial stresses that caused a
concentrated force on welds that prestressed them, and poor construction that weakened
the welds. These shortcomings of the designs led to the unexpected premature brittle
failure of the welds and base metals of the connections. The brittle nature of the failures
completely neutralized the concept of the moment resisting frames that basically relies on
ductile behavior to dissipate energy. Thus, the failures essentially revealed that the Pre-
Northridge SMRF connections were unreliable and had to be replaced in both existing
structures and future construction.
3.2 New guidelines for SMRF connections
The reaction of the federal and local government agencies in Los Angeles to the
failures of the SMRF connections was to prohibit construction of connections based on
the faulty provisions set in the 1994 Uniform Building Code and to begin research into
the design of adequate connection systems. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) considered the connection failures as a serious risk to the welfare of the public
and as a result, contributed $11 million dollars to form a team of experts, known as the
SAC joint venture, to investigate and propose solutions for new connection systems [1].
The SAC joint venture consisted of a partnership of the Structural Engineers Association
of California, Applied Technology Council, and California Universities for Research in
Earthquake Engineering. The findings and recommendations of the SAC joint venture
were adopted by the County of Los Angeles as the new criteria for SMRF connections.
As previously discussed in this paper, the SAC joint venture first investigated the reasons
for the failures of the SMRF connections. After determining the factors that led to the
brittle failures of the connections, the SAC joint venture then developed new guidelines
for engineers to follow in the design of new and improved SMRF connection systems.
The suggestions of the SAC joint venture involved both general aspects as well as
specific requirements involving the design, materials, workmanship, and testing of new
connections.
The first of the SAC suggestions for the design of new SMRF connection systems
is a set of general guidelines for engineers and designers to keep in mind as they create
new SMRF connections. The guidelines suggest that sound engineering principles be
employed in the design of new connections. It is hoped that by focusing on basic
principles, new designs will be properly created with the safety and welfare of the public
explicitly in mind. In a bulletin issued by the County of Los Angeles Department of
Public Works, the basic principles that should be clearly understood in the design of
connection systems include:
* Theories of mechanics and kinematics, including fracture mechanics.
* Elastic and inelastic behavior of materials and systems, including
inelastic energy absorption capability.
* Concept of strong-column/weak beam.
* Redundancy in the design of lateral force resisting system.
* The realities of the construction process, its limitations and
imperfections. [1]
The importance of adhering to these basic engineering principles in the creation of new
connection system is summarized by the County of Los Angeles in the following
statement.
A fully identified system should consist of a clear and rational load path
and reasonable assurance that all element stresses or distortions are within
predictable and repeatable capability provided by each component's
properties. A design method that is based on proven theories, controllable
material properties, and repeatable test results: and that accounts for
construction and inspection realities, can significantly reduce if not avoid
future damage and loss from either earthquakes or other lateral force
phenomena. [1]
Thus, the general guidelines set forth by the SAC joint venture and the County of Los
Angeles clearly indicate that safety and reliability can be ensured by consciously applying
basic, fundamental concepts to new schemes for SMRF connections.
The next area of concern that was addressed by the SAC and Los Angeles County
guidelines for SMRF connections involves the uncertainties in the properties of the
materials used in the connections. The guidelines attribute the material failures that were
observed after the Northridge earthquake to the erroneous assumption on the part of
engineers that materials used in the steel members and welds was homogenous and
isotropic. Faults and discontinuities in the steel that could lower the performance levels of
the material were not considered. The main consequence of this assumption is that the
steel from which the connections were made was expected to perform at inaccurately high
levels. The investigators concluded that this simplification of material properties could
undermine the results given by computer analysis of connection systems that indicate that
the connections will perform at a safe and satisfactory level. As a response to this
problem the Los Angeles County guidelines suggest careful material testing of the
structural steel, such as the Certified Mill Test Report (CMTR) and lab tests on coupons
taken from the members, should be done with close examination of the accuracy of the
results. This can be done by answering the following questions:
* How does one obtain the yield point, yield stress/strain curve and yield
strength for seismic design?
* Should the coupons be taken from the flange or web, at what
locations?
* What is the proper strain rate to determine the strength properties used
in seismic design?
* What is the effect of the randomness of properties? [1]
Another material uncertainty addressed by the guidelines involves the welds used in
connections. The guidelines suggest that engineers can deal with uncertainties in the weld
material by being aware of the difference in performance of field welds versus shop
welds. Field welds are difficult to install and, as a result, are weaker than shop welds.
Engineers designing new connections should remember this and base new schemes on the
assumption of having less than optimal performance from any welds that are installed in
the field. This extra caution should introduce more redundancy and reliability in the
welds used in new connection systems.
In short, the recommendations regarding material properties set forth by the SAC
joint venture and the County of Los Angeles stress that imperfections can dramatically
effect the performance of the materials. Engineers should make sure material tests are
carefully done and results are accurate. Furthermore, designers should not create
connection schemes that are based on optimal material performance. Thus, while these
measures may increase costs and delay the development of new connections, they will
ensure that the systems are safe and reliable.
The constructability of new connection systems is the next area addressed by the
SAC and LA County guidelines for new SMRF connections. The guidelines recognize the
fact that construction, even when carefully inspected and controlled, is not perfect. The
actual constructed facility will not be an exact match of the calculated plans. There is not
much that can be done to change these construction realities because exact tolerances that
can be achieved in a controlled laboratory environment are practically impossible to
achieve in the field. Therefore, the LA County guidelines suggest that engineers should
keep this in mind and use careful engineering judgment to adjust results from laboratory
testing to the less exact outcomes that can be expected in the field. Basically, engineers
should expect lesser performance in the field than what can be achieved in shop practice.
The last area of concern that is addressed in the LA County guidelines involves
flaws in the basic design of the Pre-Northridge SMRF connections that suffered brittle
failure. These issues were discussed in detail in chapter two and are repeated below as a
brief review of the pertinent issues. The LA County guidelines warn engineers to be
aware of the following design aspects:
* Uncertain through-thickness properties of column flange base metal.
* Troublesome T-joint complete penetration groove welds.
* Triaxial stress concentrations at the beam/column junction.
* Column web panel zone design.
* Effect of variation of material properties. [1]
These aspects have been found to be lead to brittle failure and should be avoided by
engineers in the design of new connection systems.
3.3 Conclusions
After the extensive investigation and research that was done in the aftermath of
the Northridge earthquake, it was obvious that the existing SMRF connections and code
standards were inadequate and unreliable. A considerable amount of time, money, and
other resources was invested to find solutions for this problem. The guidelines that were
presented in this chapter represent the results of the tireless efforts of engineers and
researchers. Hopefully, these guidelines will be used by designers to develop new SMRF
connections that are reliable and, most importantly, safe.
4. SidePlate Connection System
4.1 Introduction
The first new design for a SMRF connection system that was approved for use in
Los Angeles County was the SidePlate system developed by Meyers Nelson Houghton
(MNH) of Lawndale California. The MNH system was thoroughly tested and based on a
design methodology that specifically addressed the problems that contributed to the brittle
failures of the Pre-Northridge connections. The system was endorsed by the Los Angeles
County Technical Advisory Panel (LACO-TAP) "as the best technical choice for
immediate use in new construction, given adherence by the County's structural engineers
to the restrictions and guidelines..." [1]. The SidePlate technology was the first design that
satisfied all of the testing and design standards that were set by the SAC joint venture and




Fig. 4.1 The SidePlate connection system from SidePlate Moment Connection System: Design Guide [11]
The SidePlate system prevents brittle failures by incorporating a unique geometry
between the steel members and a simple design configuration. The most outstanding
aspect of the SidePlate connection is an actual physical space between the beam and the
column. The benefit of this spacing is that it removes any reliance on the technical
uncertainties in the design of SMRF connections that were found to cause brittle fracture.
This is possible because the SidePlate connection does not use a T-joint complete
penetration weld to directly connect the beam flange to the column flange. The lack of
this weld removes any danger of brittle failure of the connection due to through-thickness
properties, triaxial stresses, and weak panel zones that contributed to the failures of many
Pre-Northridge connections. In short, the MNH SidePlate technology has been shown to
satisfy all of the design and performance requirements that were set forth by investigators
and has also removed vulnerability to brittle failure in SMRF connections.
This chapter will discuss the design specifications of the SidePlate system, the
results of the various tests that were conducted to verify the validity of the system, and
detail some of the costs and benefits associated with the system.
4.2 Design specifications
The basic means through which the SidePlate connection system works is based
on the transfer of all axial, shear, and flexural loads from the beam to the column without
using a complete penetration weld to directly connect the members but instead
incorporates an actual open space between the beam and the column. This separation is
achieved through the use of parallel side plates to connect the members. The system relies
on three basic mechanisms to transfer the various applied loads from the beam, through
the plates, and into the column. The locations of these three mechanisms are represented
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Fig. 4.2 Performance Mechanisms of the SidePlate system from SidePlate: Design Guide [11]
Exact performance and design specifications are proprietary information of SidePlate
Systems Incorporated and cannot be discussed in great detail. Therefore, a general
overview of the three mechanisms will be presented here.
4.2.1 First transfer mechanism: point A
The first mechanism, represented by point A in figure 4.2, is designed to transfer
the loads from the beam to the side plates. The transfer occurs through the shear and
cover plates which take vertical and horizontal loads from the beam and move them into
the side plates. The first load transfer mechanism acts like the first buffer that absorbs
and displaces energy that comes into the connection from the beam. The mechanism
requires the design of welds to join the vertical shear plate to the side plate, welds to
connect the beam flange cover plates to the side plate, and sizing of the cover and vertical
shear plates. The welds are sized using weld group theory and the tension/compression
force couple method. The larger of these two methods determines the critical stresses that
the welds must safely withstand. From here, the length of the welds are check to make
sure that they are not longer than the AISC recommended 70t, where t is the size of the
weld (AISC). Lastly, the weld sizes are checked to make sure that they agree with the size
of the smallest plate.
The cover plate transfers load from the beam to the side plate through shear.
Furthermore, the cover plate is also used to bridge the gap between the width of the beam
and the width of the column. The size of the cover plate is determined based on length
and thickness criteria. The length of the cover plate determines the length of the welds
that will connect it to the beam flange. Therefore, the length of the cover plate must not
exceed 70 times the size of the weld. The thickness of the cover plate is controlled by the
required area to resist the applied shear stresses. This area is taken as the connected
length of the cover plate to the side plate times the thickness of the plate.
The height and width of the plate are determined by the sizes of the beam and
column depths. The thickness of the shear plate is the same as the thickness of the beam
flange. This plate is designed to have enough shear capacity to withstand the stresses
caused by the applied loads.
4.2.2 Second transfer mechanism: point B
Point B in figure 4.2 represents the location of the second transfer mechanism for
the connection system. At point B, the side plates act alone to transfer flexural, axial, and
shear loads that act on the beam across the gap between the beam and the column. The
design of this mechanism is based on trying to control the plasticity of the extreme ends
of the plates. The goal is to limit the plastification to a level that corresponds to 1% strain
in the material. This limit on the level of strain allows for safe and predictable plastic
behavior to be expected and assumed. In order to achieve this limit, the size of the side
plates must satisfy AISC requirements for minimum thickness to resist flexural loads.
4.2.3 Third transfer mechanism: point C
The last load transfer mechanism is shown as point C in figure 4.2. This
mechanism takes the loads from the side plates and moves them into the core of the
column. This mechanism requires the design of vertical welds to connect the column
flanges to the side plates, horizontal welds that connect the side plates to the shear plates,
and horizontal shear plates that transfer loads from the welds to the column. The welds
are designed with the same standards for length and required strength as the welds in the
first transfer mechanism. The size of the horizontal shear plates are determined by the
geometry of the beam and the column along with the stress distribution in the plates
caused by the applied loads.
4.3 Cyclic testing
The design and performance specifications of the SidePlate connection system
were verified by cyclic tests performed on prototypes. These tests are required by the
guidelines set by SAC and the County of Los Angeles in order to qualify new connection
systems. The testing requirements are meant to "ensure that the 'tested' connection system
they choose to use will deliver the properties of joint performance assumed by their
design methodology and analytical computer programs". More specifically, the SAC
guidelines require tests to be performed on prototypes of connection systems that "should
replicate as closely as practicable the reality of the as-built structure". Furthermore, the
main goal of a successful testing program should be to determine the possibility of brittle
failure of a connection system. From this, a successful connection will be shown to have
little or no probability of suffering a sudden brittle failure during cyclic loading similar to
the effect caused by an earthquake. In light of these requirements, prototypes of the
SidePlate connection technology were subjected to both uniaxial and biaxial tests.
Moreover, these cyclic tests were performed to determine the rotational performance of
the system and to check the strength of the various elements of the system [7].
The first test that was performed was the uniaxial moment connection test. This
experiment cyclically loads the connection in a single plane at various magnitudes of
applied force and displacement. In the tests that were performed to verify the SidePlate
system the members consisted of an A36 grade steel beam and grade A50 steel column
and side plates. The electrode used for the welds was E70T-7. It should be noted that
these are standard electrodes Three sets of SidePlate connections were used in the
uniaxial test program [7]. The setup for the uniaxial test is shown on figure 4.3 below.
Fig. 4.3 Uniaxial Test Setup from Houghton and Uang [7]
The uniaxial test was performed by loading the connection by three cycles at 75
kips followed by three more cycles at 150 kips. After the loading cycles, the system was
subjected to three cycles each of displacements at + 1 inch, + 1.5 inches, + 2 inches, and
so forth. Researchers used displacement transducers, strain gages, and strain rosettes to
collect data from the tests. The main result of the uniaxial test is shown in figure 4.4
below.
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Fig. 4.4 Results of Uniaxial Testing from Houghton and Uang [7]
Figure 4.4 shows the response of the system. The figure indicates that of the total
deflection that the connection experienced, the majority of it occurred in the beam.
Almost no deflection occurred in the column or the panel zones. This result shows that
inelastic deformation will likely occur in the beam beyond the cover plates. More
importantly, the deformation was observed to occur in a slow and ductile fashion. The
results from the various uniaxial tests show that the plastic hinge forms at a distance
equal to one third of the beam depth from the ends of the side plates [7]. The plastic hinge
is represented by the point labeled Mp in figure 4.2. The location of the plastic hinge at
this point shows that any deformation will occur in the beam and not in the hinge. The
formation of the plastic hinge in one of the test specimens is shown in figure 4.5 on the
next page.
Fig. 4.5 Plastic Hinge in Uniaxial Test from Houghton and Uang [7]
The second test that was conducted on the SidePlate system was a dual axis
moment experiment that basically loads the system in two planes. The biaxial stress
applied during this test simulates the most critical loading case that the column can be
expected to experience. The configuration of the dual axis test is shown in figure 4.6 on
the next page.
Fig. 4.6 Experimental Setup for the Biaxial Test from Houghton and Uang [7]
The general results of the dual axis experiment were similar to the results from the
uniaxial test. The displacement response of the system in the biaxial test is shown in
figure 4.7 and the observed deformation is shown in figure 4.8. These figures indicate that
the majority of the deformation occurs in the beams and away from the connection.
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Fig. 4.7 Results from Biaxial Testing from Houghton and Uang [7]
Fig. 4.8 Deformation in Biaxial Test from Houghton and Uang [7]
These results from the biaxial experiments show that even for the worse possible

















The final segment of the testing process involved the comparison of the results
from the actual physical tests with the results predicted by finite element and non-linear
analysis computer testing. The finite element and non-linear computer analyses were
performed by Meyers, Houghton & Partners, Incorporated and by researchers at the
University of Utah, respectively. The finite element testing was conducted to verify the
results from the prototype testing and also to model the system using varying member
sizes. Figure 4.9 shows the computer generated prediction of the deformation of the beam
in the uniaxial test. The results of the finite element analysis predicted behavior that was
very similar to the observed behavior from the prototype tests.
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Fig. 4.9 Predicted Behavior from Finite Element Modeling from Houghton and Uang [7]
In addition to verifying the experimentally observed behavior, the finite element
testing was used to model the system with different member sizes than those used in the
prototype testing. This was done to show that the system was flexible and could be used
with different size beams and columns. From the finite element testing, it was shown that
the system can be used with different member sizes ranging from a lower bound limit of
W21X50 for the beams and W14X90 for the column to an upper bound of W36X150 for
beams and W14X426 for columns [7].
Along with the finite element modeling, nonlinear computer analysis was
performed to also verify the observed failure mode and plastic behavior. Like the results
of the finite element testing, the results of the nonlinear analysis showed a strong
correlation to the observed behavior of the prototype tests. A comparison of the predicted
behavior from a nonlinear analysis with a view of the actual observed plastic behavior is
shown in figure 4.10.
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Fig. 4.10 Comparison of Experimental Results with Nonlinear Analysis from Houghton and Uang [7]
In short, the SidePlate connection system was tested both theoretically in various
computer analysis and in physical tests on actual prototype specimens. These experiments
satisfied the LA County requirements of conducting both simulated and actual tests. Also,
the tests revealed and verified the performance of the system and more importantly,
affirmed the reliability and safety of the connection.
4.4 Costs and Constructability benefits
In addition to seismic resistant performance of the SidePlate connection system,
there are cost and other factors that further make the system attractive to owners and
builders. Compared to other seismic resistant connection systems, the SidePlate
technology has been found to be substantially cheaper. On the average, post - Northridge
connections cost $1750 to $1900 per ton while the SidePlate system costs about $1400
per ton [7]. A cost comparison between the SidePlate connection and other systems that
was performed for the North San Diego County Regional Center showed that the use of
the SidePlate system saved more than $700,000 in the cost of the building [9]. A detailed
breakdown of the costs associated with the various connection systems that were
considered for this project is located in the appendix of this report. The lower cost of the
SidePlate connection system can be attributed to the stiffness that the side plates. The
stiffness of the side plates effectively replace the required stiffness of the beams which
reduces the required sizes of the beams. The smaller sizes of the beams leads to a
reduction of the overall tonnage of steel used in the buildings which leads to cost savings.
Another benefit of the SidePlate connection is the overall ease of constructability
of the system. The construction of a facility using the SidePlate system is shown in figure
4.11 on the next page.
Fig. 4.11 Construction Using SidePlate Connections from SidePlate Systems Inc. [11]
The SidePlate technology utilizes a column tree type of construction that allows
for safer and easier installation of the beams to the columns. As shown in figures 4.12 and
4.13 on the next page, these column trees allow the workers to actually sit on the
connection and guide the beams into place. The sitting position is safer than other
installation methods because the workers do not have to lean or reach out and risk falling
off of the building. A further constructability related benefit is that the column trees are
shop welded instead of field welded. This preassembly in a controlled shop environment
eliminates uncertainty in the quality of the welds, which has been a problem with field
welded construction.
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Fig. 4.12 Column Tree Construction From SidePlate Inc. [11]
Fig. 4.13 Installation of Beams into Column Trees From SidePlate Inc. [11]
4.5 Conclusions
As of March 1997, the SidePlate connection technology was the only SMRF
connection system that was endorsed by the county of Los Angeles as an acceptable
scheme that provides adequate seismic performance. The SidePlate system satisfied all of
the county requirements in terms of addressing of the acknowledged problem areas and
adequately testing the design to determine and verify the performance of the system. The
SidePlate system was designed with a complete understanding of the potential weak spots
in previous designs such as through thickness properties and panel zone weakness. As a
result, the system is based on ideas that avoid the problem areas and thereby essentially
eliminates the potential weak spots. The SidePlate system was tested using both computer
simulations and actual prototype experiments that clearly demonstrated the performance
attributes of the system. These tests showed that the use of the SidePlate connection
system will allow for the desirable ductile behavior to properly develop in Steel Moment
Resisting Frames during an earthquake. Lastly, the SidePlate connection system offers the
added benefits of lower costs and easier construction.
When taking into account all of these benefits, it is obvious that the SidePlate
connection system offers a technically and economic solution to the design of an adequate
SMRF connection.
5. Observations and Recommendations
In the aftermath of the 1994 Northridge earthquake it was discovered that the
connections of many Steel Moment Resisting Frames unexpectedly failed in a brittle
manner. The ensuing investigation into the causes of the brittle failures revealed that the
designs of previous SMRF connections had serious flaws in materials, workmanship, and
design. The materials properties of both the weld metal and base metals were over
estimated by designers in terms of the expected ductility and toughness of the materials.
Next, inspections of the construction of the connections revealed that faults in the
workmanship, particularly in the quality of the welding, further weakened the SMRF
connections. Finally and perhaps most importantly, the investigations revealed that the
existing connections had some fundamental problems in their design that not only
inhibited the desired ductile behavior but in some cases seemed to actually amplify the
effects that cause brittle failure.
In response to the crisis created by the failures of the SMRF connections, the
building code and Los Angeles County requirements for acceptable connections was
carefully reviewed and revised. The new set of requirements addressed the material,
construction, and design problems that were associated with the old connection systems
through stringent testing requisites and by stressing the use of fundamental engineering
principles in the creation of new systems. It is hoped that these detailed requirements will
ensure that SMRF connections will perform in a predictable and reliable manner.
As described in this report, the SidePlate connection system was the first new
connection technology that has successfully satisfied all of the new requirements for
SMRF connections. The performance of the SidePlate system was proven through
extensive testing involving both computer simulations and actual physical experiments on
prototypes of the connection. Furthermore, the various experiments have proven that the
SidePlate system is viable for different types of loading and is flexible enough to be used
with a wide range of member sizes. Also, the SidePlate system provides additional
stiffness which reduces the required member sizes which leads to a sizable reduction in
the amount of steel usage. This reduced quantity of steel translates to significant cost
savings in the overall construction of the structures.
In light of all of these benefits, perhaps the greatest achievement of the SidePlate
SMRF connection system is its unique design that is so radically different from the Pre-
Northridge connections. These fundamental differences essentially eliminate any reliance
on the vulnerabilities of the old designs that undermined the performance and
effectiveness of the connections.
Thus, the combination of the unique design of the SidePlate system with the
verification of its performance through extensive testing have established that the
SidePlate system is reliable and cost effective, for steel moment resisting frame
connections.
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7. Appendix
SAN DINGO NORTx COUNTY REGIONAL CENTER
COST STUDY
Option 1 - Original structure with eccentric braced frames
and moment frames with cover plates
Steel wt. - 2210 tons 0 $1700 per ton
218 full penetration welds
Steel cost $3-------------------------,867,500
Steel cost = $3,867,500
Additional items: Rock anchors




Total costs = $101,000
Option 1 Coat = $3,968,500
Option 2 - Moment frames with SidePlate Connections
Steel weight = 2015 tons 0 $1450 per ton
148 one-sided connections
52 two-sided connections
Steel cost = $2,921,750 actual bid cost
Additional items: Licensing fee for use of connection
$69,000
Option 2 Cost = $2,990,750
Option 3 - Moment frames with bottom haunch connections
Steel weight = 2215 tons 0 $1700 per ton
354 full penetration welds
-----------------------~~--
Steel cost = $3,765,500
We see from this information that Option 2 saved in excess of
$700,000 over any of the other options. Our experience has shown
that we cannot achieve much less than $1700 per ton for
fabrication & erection of moment frames with reinforced, full
penetration weld connections.
